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TIME TO ELIMINATE THE PENNY 





In “Eliminating the Penny from the U.S. Coinage System: An Economic Analysis,” 
Raymond Lombra [2001] notes several adverse effects of eliminating the penny. He 
argues that elimination of the penny will a) impose a sizeable and regressive “rounding 
tax” on consumers, b) boost the inﬂ  ation rate and federal government outlays, c) drive 
up ﬁ  rms’ costs and squeeze their proﬁ  ts, and d) deprive the government of consider-
able seigniorage. In this note I reexamine these ﬁ  ndings in light of new evidence and 
conclude that it is probably time for the U.S. Mint to cease minting pennies.
NEW FINDINGS ON THE “ROUNDING TAX”
The heart of Lombra’s analysis is his estimate of the losses to consumers if the 
penny were eliminated and cash prices were rounded up or down to the nearest 
nickel. Using data from the price book of a typical convenience store, he shows that 
the last digit for over eighty percent of prices is a nine. Simulating 5000 purchases of 
from one to three items across the full spectrum of the 3585 items in the price book, 
he estimates that 60 percent of the transactions result in rounding upward if three 
items are purchased and up to 93 percent are rounded upward if one or two items 
are bought. As a lower bound, if half of the 106 billion annual consumer transactions 
were made with cash and 60 percent were rounded upward, consumers would col-
lectively lose $318 million per year. As an upper bound, if 83 percent of transactions 
use cash and 93 percent have prices rounded upward, the loss to consumers would 
be $818 million annually.
The ﬁ  rst limitation of this analysis is that it is unknown how many items (and 
in what combinations) consumers purchase from convenience stores. The “rounding 
tax” is lower as more items are purchased, but information on how many items are 
purchased was unavailable to Lombra and many purchases involve more than three 
items. More problematically this calculation assumes that all such transactions are 
not taxed. Chande and Fisher’s [2003] simulations show that the “rounding tax” es-
sentially disappears in Canada where all items are taxed. Convenience stores’ goods 
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tors [2006], only ﬁ  ve U.S. states (Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and 
Oregon), with 2.5 percent of the U.S. population, have no sales tax. On the other hand, 
many items purchased at convenience stores are food items which are exempt from 
sales tax in most states. States exempting food from sales tax made up 71.7 percent 
of the U.S. population in 2006.1 
Given these complexities, it is unclear how rounding current prices would affect 
American consumers. Fortunately, I was able to obtain data on nearly 200,000 indi-
vidual transactions from a convenience store chain that operates in seven states in 
the eastern U.S. – Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, and Virginia.2 The general sales tax and food sales tax rates for these 
states are given in Table 1.
 TABLE  1
  Sales Tax Rates in Seven States (July 2005)
State  Sales Tax Rate  Sales Tax on Food
Alabama 4  4
Georgia  4  0, but subject to local sales tax
North Carolina  4.5  0, but subject to local sales tax
Pennsylvania 6  0
South Carolina  5  5
Tennessee 7 6
Virginia 5  3.5
Table 2 reports the gains and losses during a one-week period to this chain’s 
consumers if their bills were to be rounded to the nearest nickel. The ﬁ  rst column 
reports all transactions, including both cash and non-cash transactions. The second 
column reports all transactions on which sales tax was charged – thus excluding 
gasoline-only (and some other) purchases. The data set mixes together cash and non-
cash transactions, but there are a couple of close proxies for cash transactions in the 
third and fourth columns of Table 2. The best proxy is probably transactions in which 
change was returned.3 Another proxy is transactions in which the total amount paid 
is less than $5.
As the table demonstrates, the total effect on buyers and sellers from rounding 
current totals to the nearest nickel would be very, very small. Across twenty stores 
and 185,714 transactions, consumers win – but the total gain to customers is only 
$105.60 or about one-twentieth of a cent per transaction. This amounts to a tiny loss 
of 75.4 cents per store per day. In every state the results are similar. In a few states 
consumers lose a hair, in the rest they gain a hair or two. The largest margin is a 
customer gain of about one-eighth of a cent per sale in North Carolina. 
Pennsylvania may be the most nationally-representative of these states, since it 
does not charge sales tax on food. In Pennsylvania, customers do lose from rounding, 
but the losses are not more than half a cent per transaction as Lombra’s simulation 
implies. Consumers’ losses in Pennsylvania add up to an inﬁ  nitesimal $1.79 or one 
cent for every 67 transactions. 
Lombra’s analysis focuses on cash transactions, but these don’t appear to differ 
from overall transactions. For the transactions in which change was returned to 141 TIME TO ELIMINATE THE PENNY
the customer – almost all of which would have been cash transactions4 – customers 
collectively would have gained $23.82 from rounding to the nearest nickel or about 
one-fortieth of a penny per transaction. Likewise, customers would win marginally 
from rounding of purchases that come out to less than $5, with a collective gain of 
$28.87 or 1/26th of a cent per transaction. The bottom line is that rounding would 
have essentially no effect on consumers or sellers as a group, if these transactions 
are indicative. The “rounding tax” is effectively zero. 
 
 TABLE  2
  Customers’ Gains and Losses from Rounding to the Nearest Nickel 
  State  All Transactions:  Transactions with Sales Tax 
(# of stores)  Column 1  Column 2
  Gain/Loss to  Total   Gain/Loss  Gain/Loss to  Total  Gain/Loss
 Customers  Transactions  per Customers  Transactions per 
     Transaction      Transaction
Alabama (1)  +$6.12  10,730  +0.057 cents  +$0.51  5540  +0.009 cents
Georgia (4)  +$30.18  43,885  +0.069 cents  +$13.37  25,762  +0.052 cents
North Carolina (5)  +$44.24  33,870  +0.131 cents  +$34.69  22,681  +0.153 cents
Pennsylvania (1)  -$1.79  12,034  -0.015 cents  +$8.91  6080  +0.147 cents
South Carolina (4)  +$19.98  41,275  +0.048 cents  -$4.52  24,355  -0.019 cents
Tennessee (1)  +$3.16  10,039  +0.031 cents  +$1.06  6501  +0.016 cents
Virginia (4)  +$3.71  33,881  +0.011 cents  -$11.89  17,198  -0.069 cents
All Locations (20)  +$105.60  185,714  +0.057 cents  +$42.13  108,117  +0.039 cents
Akron Drive  +$6.29  7001  +0.090 cents  +$4.93  5255  +0.094 cents
Stratford Road  +7.46  6591  +0.113 cents  +$5.40  4223  +0.128 cents
  State  Change-Returned Transactions  Transactions Less Than $5
(# of stores)  Column 3  Column 4
  Gain/Loss to  Total   Gain/Loss  Gain/Loss to  Total  Gain/Loss
 Customers  Transactions  per Customers  Transactions per 
     Transaction      Transaction
Alabama (1)  +$1.44  5550  +0.026 cents  +$0.47  3437  +0.014 cents
Georgia (4)  +$9.13  23,576  +0.039 cents  +$11.62  18,530  +0.063 cents
North Carolina (5)  +$19.29  18,641  +0.103 cents  +$26.53  15,775  +0.168 cents
Pennsylvania (1)  -$4.84  7245  -0.067 cents  -$2.88  5282  -0.055 cents
South Carolina (4)  +$1.09  23,304  +0.005 cents  -$5.57  17,064  -0.033 cents
Tennessee (1)  +$2.06  6177  +0.033 cents  +$3.06  4383  +0.070 cents
Virginia (4)  -$4.35  16,029  -0.027 cents  -$4.36  11,864  -0.037 cents
All Locations (20)  +$23.82  100,552  +0.024 cents  +$28.87  76,355  +0.038 cents
Akron Drive  +$1.93  4626  +0.042 cents  +$3.78  3608  +0.105 cents
Stratford Road  +$3.88  3775  +0.103 cents  +$3.48  2807  +0.124 cents
Again, in both of these cases customers in Pennsylvania would have lost a few 
dollars – $4.84 on change-returned transactions and $2.88 on purchases of less than 
$5 – but again the losses are very small – 0.067 and 0.055 cents per transaction, re-
spectively. Slicing the data more thinly reveals exactly which Pennsylvania custom-
ers would lose. Losses on purchases of less than $5 total $2.88, but losses on the 571 
purchases of less than $1 make up more than all of this amount – $4.91. Customers 
buying a single untaxed item whose price is less than $1.00 and whose price ends in 
the 9 digit are the “big” losers. Those spending less than one dollar have a loss rate of 
0.86 cents per transaction, but their collective loss is less than $5 per week at a store 142 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
processing over 12,000 transactions per week. These customers are fairly atypical, 
making up  4.7 percent of purchases.
Lombra’s conclusion that the tax would be regressive is also not supported by these 
data. The bottom rows of Table 2 compare two stores in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. 
The store on Stratford Road is in a fairly afﬂ  uent section of the city, while the store on 
Akron Drive is in the poorer section of town. The rounding estimates are essentially the 
same in both settings – with customers coming out slightly ahead in both locations.5
IMPACT ON INFLATION
Lombra’s second major contention is that rounding would cause the inﬂ  ation 
rate to rise slightly and boost federal government outlays by $1 billion per year or 
more. This conclusion is mistaken because, as shown above, there appears to be es-
sentially no “rounding tax.” Even if there were a “rounding tax,” however, the calcu-
lation would be incorrect because eliminating the penny would at most (according to 
Lombra’s calculations) introduce a one-time increase in prices of about 1/100 of one 
percent. Such a small increase wouldn’t generally affect the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI), which isn’t calculated this precisely. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports 
the CPI with only one decimal point. For example, in January, 2006 the CPI for all 
urban consumers was 198.3 (1982-84=100). A 1/100th of one percent increase would 
boost it to 198.31983, but the BLS would round this to 198.3, so there would be no 
change. A 1/100th of one percent increase would have only about a one-in-ﬁ  ve chance 
of boosting the index to the next signiﬁ  cant digit. Several federal expenditures and 
revenues streams, such as Social Security and the income tax code, are indexed to 
the CPI, but they calculate the inﬂ  ation rate to the tenths digit, so a 1/100th of one 
percent increase would have only a one-in-ten chance of changing the ofﬁ  cial inﬂ  ation 
rate in one year, under Lombra’s scenario. 
More importantly, the elimination of the penny would not stop prices from being 
quoted in cents and non-cash payments – which are now more common than cash pay-
ments [Dove Consulting, 2005] – could and would still be made in cents, so the prices 
recorded by the BLS wouldn’t change at all, nor would its calculation of the CPI.6 
IMPACT ON PROFITS AND COSTS
Lombra also concludes that rounding could hurt ﬁ  rms by squeezing their thin 
proﬁ  t margins as it undermines the penny’s role in theft deterrence, boosts the costs 
of retraining workers and spurs costly non-cash transactions. In response, sellers will 
react strategically and raise prices.
Chande and Fisher [2003, 517] acknowledge that retailers could act strategically, 
if they knew how frequently different combinations of items are purchased, but con-
clude that the amount gained per transaction “would be so trivially small as to have 
little impact” on consumer behavior and welfare. Just as importantly, the convenience 
store market is very competitive, so any change that affects all the ﬁ  rms in the market 
– such as eliminating the penny – would have virtually no effect on their proﬁ  t levels. 
Proﬁ  ts will tend to the normal level both with and without pennies. In competitive 
industries prices reﬂ  ect costs, so prices would rise only if costs rise. 143 TIME TO ELIMINATE THE PENNY
In addition, it is unlikely that pennies and ﬁ  nal-digit nines have much of a theft-
deterrent role currently – because of taxes, few in-store transactions ever come out to 
an exact dollar amount.7 Likewise, today’s technology thwarts the kind of employee 
theft that pennies may have once deterred – theft via the employee failing to register 
the sale and pocketing the cash, which may be thwarted by the need to make change. 
In most convenience stores such a ploy would be fairly obvious since customers are 
conditioned to seeing the sales amount displayed on the register and hearing a “blip” 
when each item is scanned. They often look to see if the register rang up the correct 
amount, which is rarely marked on the package anymore. 
The costs of retraining employees to operate in a penny-less economy, if they exist 
at all, are likely to be minor. The employee need only follow standard procedure, scan-
ning items and waiting for the register to calculate how much is owed and how much 
change is due. Countering any temporary learning costs, the elimination of pennies 
would save a modicum of time spent fumbling with change – by both the customer 
and the clerk – increasing efﬁ  ciency. Across the twenty stores in this sample, 36.3 
percent of the transactions involved returning pennies in change. If the use of a penny 
adds even one second to the transaction time, this represents 67,480 seconds or 18.74 
hours of time for the clerk, the customer, any companions of the customer and anyone 
in line. Average wages of retail clerks in 2004 were $9.39 per hour or 0.26 cents per 
second [Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2005]. Using this wage, the value of lost time from 
dealing with pennies among the clerks at these twenty stores totaled $175.97, which 
dwarfs the estimates of the gains or losses from rounding. The average overall wage 
(2004) was $18.09 per hour or 0.5025 cents per second, so the cost of the customers’ 
time wasted was $339 in this sample. Applying these rates to Lombra’s estimate of 
106 billion transactions nationally each year and using the above estimates that 36.3 
percent of transactions involve returning pennies and that returning a penny requires 
about one extra second, this implies that the value of wasted time is 106 billion sec-
onds x 0.363 x (0.26 + 0.5025 cents per second) = $293.4 million. This sum is fairly 
small – equaling about $1 per person per year – but it understates the cost somewhat 
because it omits the impact on companions and others in line who have to wait and 
it omits cases where pennies are tendered by the customer. If use of pennies adds 2.5 
seconds to the average transaction, these losses reach $733.5 million per year.8
Whether or not the elimination of pennies leads to a greater number of non-cash 
transactions is an open question, but the marginal cost of such transactions has be-
come low enough that more and more retailers have voluntarily adopted credit and 
debit payment for low-value transactions – even in fast food restaurants and vending 
machines.
One reason given for the ubiquity of prices ending in nines is that they fool some 
customers into thinking the item is substantially cheaper than it really is. Apparently 
the gap between 99 cents and one dollar just seems larger than the gap between $1.00 
and $1.01 to some customers. With the elimination of the penny, the perception that 
99 cents is substantially less than one dollar might erode, so retailers may gradually 
abandon the use of ﬁ  nal-digit nines.9 However, after the Netherlands began requir-
ing retailers to round prices to the nearest zero or ﬁ  ve cents, retailers continued the 
practice of ending most prices with nine [Tiplady, 2004].
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IMPACT ON SEIGNIORAGE
Lombra’s ﬁ  nal point is that eliminating the penny will cost the U.S. Mint sub-
stantial seigniorage each year. The Mint reported seigniorage from pennies of $24.6 
million for ﬁ  scal 2001 but since the publication of Lombra’s article these ﬁ  gures have 
fallen substantially – to $8.8 million in 2002, $1.0 million in 2003 and $4.6 million in 
2004. However, it is not clear that these calculations are accurate because the Mint 
allocates overhead costs across its coins and the portion allocated to pennies is a very 
small fraction.10 A more realistic share of overhead attributed to pennies would wipe 
out seigniorage from them completely.11
Recent events have substantially undermined the argument that the penny 
should be maintained because of the proﬁ  t it generates for the Mint. By any account-
ing the Mint will show negative seigniorage from pennies for 2005 and 2006 – and it 
is likely to do so well into the future. The price of zinc, which comprises 97.5 percent 
of a penny, averaged about 35 cents per pound in 2002 and much of 2003, rose to 45 
cents at the end of 2003, passed 60 cents in early 2005, then exploded to $1.50 per 
pound in mid 2006 and $2.00 near the end of the year [Kitco Base Metals, 2006]. In 
mid-November 2006 the value of the metal in a penny equaled 1.1 cents. Analysts at 
the International Monetary Fund blame the wider surge in metals prices on strong 
international demand, especially from China. Although, they foresee a fall in these 
prices as the supply curve becomes more responsive, positive seigniorage on pennies 
will only return if the cost of the metal content falls back to at least the level of early 
2003, but based on estimates for more widely used metals, like copper and aluminum, 
this seems unlikely to occur by the end of the decade [IMF, 2006]. 
In addition, the Mint’s seigniorage calculation omits part of the cost of producing 
pennies. It counts only the cost of distributing pennies from the Mint to the Federal 
Reserve. The Federal Reserve’s cost of distributing pennies across the nation is likely to 
be several-fold higher than the Mint’s distribution cost ($2 million), but it isn’t counted 
against the penny in the standard calculation of the government’s proﬁ  t from pennies. 
Chande and Fisher [2003] estimate the entire distribution costs of Canadian pennies 
to be several times higher than the revenue from selling pennies, calculating that in 
2001 the cost of manufacturing and distributing the one-cent coin was 3.95 cents per 
coin. These ﬁ  gures are likely to be fairly similar for the United States. 
Finally, seigniorage (or losses) from the penny shouldn’t be viewed in isolation. 
Eliminating the penny could be associated with the replacement of the dollar bill with 
a dollar coin. If the Mint were to forego its small (or negative) seigniorage from the 
penny, it could probably earn substantially more seigniorage from the dollar coin. 
Overall annual budgetary savings – including production and processing costs, sei-
gniorage revenue, start-up, and advertising cost – of switching from a paper to metal 
dollar have been estimated at more than $500 million [GAO, 2000].
CONCLUSIONS
Recently, N. Greg Mankiw [2006] listed eliminating the penny as one of seven New 
Year’s resolutions that politicians should make: “This year I will vote to eliminate the 
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acknowledge that the penny no longer serves that purpose. When people start leaving 
a monetary unit at the cash register for the next customer, the unit is too small to be 
useful. I know that some people will be upset when their favorite aphorisms become 
anachronistic, but a nickel saved is also a nickel earned.” 
Days later Mark W. Weller [2006], Executive Director of Americans for Common 
Cents, rebutted Mankiw citing the contention that consumers would be hit with a 
“rounding tax” totaling hundreds of millions of dollars annually and surveys that 70 
percent of Americans want Congress to keep the penny in circulation, and that 80 
percent believe merchants will use rounding as an excuse to hike prices. The primary 
source backing the contentions of this group (and others) that removing pennies will 
harm consumers is Lombra’s paper [Americans for Common Cents, 2002]. 
My ﬁ  ndings, however, suggest that rounding of current prices would not gener-
ate a “rounding tax.” Would merchants respond to the penny’s elimination by hiking 
prices? Looking at current prices cannot answer this question conclusively, but strongly 
suggests that merchants will not. Mankiw’s contention that the penny has become 
useless is an important one. Ironically, since the half-penny was eliminated in 1857, 
consumer prices have risen more than twenty-fold [Williamson, 2005], so that the 
half-penny of 1857 is the equivalent of today’s dime, having a value of 11.3 cents in 
2006 dollars. In 1857 the average nominal wage for common labor was $1.01 per day 
[Margo, 2000, Table 3A.5]. Since the workday averaged about eleven hours, hourly 
pay was about 9.2 cents. Thus, the half-penny equaled about 1/18th of the hourly pay. 
The equivalent fraction of today’s federal minimum hourly wage is 23.6 cents. By this 
metric, the half-penny was worth almost the same as a quarter in today’s economy. It 
is paradoxical that few complained about the elimination of the half-penny in 1857, 
yet there is so much concern about the loss of today’s penny – whose relative value is 
only 1/10th to 1/20th as much. 
My conclusion is that the U.S. Mint should stop producing pennies. The U.S. gov-
ernment is losing money on penny production and in light of my ﬁ  ndings, it appears 
that very little would be lost from eliminating the penny from the U.S. economy and 
more could be gained. However, individuals have the ability to use whatever they 
wish as money. If they wanted to continue using pennies, they could do so using the 
accumulated stock of pennies after the U.S. Mint discontinues minting the penny. 
 NOTES
  I thank Charlie Sweigart, Ron Padget, and Susan Flynn for helping me obtain the data used in this 
analysis.
1.  In addition some states exempt food from sales tax but allow localities to levy taxes on food. Adding 
these states to those completely exempting food from taxes boosts the percentage of the population 
living in states without a food sales tax to as much as 79.2 percent.
2.  The transactions took place between July 17 and July 23, 2005. I omitted a small percentage of the 
data that were obviously anomalous – those for which pre-tax or post-tax amounts were less than zero 
and for which the tax rate was negative or higher than plausible. 
3.  Notice that 54.1 percent of the transactions involved change being returned. This may imply that 
Lombra’s lower bound estimate (50 percent) of the percent of transactions involving cash is closer to 
the mark. Looking more broadly, beyond just convenience stores, a survey for the American Bankers 
Association (Dove Consulting, 2005) estimates that cash is used in 33 percent of in-store purchases.146 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
4.  Change is sometimes returned from debit/credit transactions, but the amounts almost universally are 
whole dollars, so if some of these exist in the data set, they won’t affect the rounding amounts.
5.  One reason that customers may gain slightly from rounding in this data set is that they occasionally 
inadvertently miss their intended mark when pumping gas – for example, aiming to pump $10.00 but 
inadvertently pumping $10.01 or $10.02. If the penny were eliminated, consumers would have more 
of an incentive to do this, but gasoline retailers would certainly respond with strategies that make it 
more difﬁ  cult to accomplish – such as slightly boosting the price of gasoline. 
6.  In addition, almost none of the federal government’s payments are made using cash, so it won’t be 
affected by the “rounding tax.”
7.  Ironically, gasoline sellers do have many sales that end in exact dollar amounts – because customers 
so often pump an exact dollar amount of gas – but the opportunity for employee theft due to this is 
not considered to be a signiﬁ  cant problem. 
8.  Many Internet sites report a study by the National Association of Convenience Stores and the 
Walgreen’s drug store chain, which found that handling pennies adds 2 to 2.5 seconds to each cash 
transaction. I have been unable to locate this study, however. 
9.  Interestingly, the nation’s largest retailer, Wal-Mart, has already moved away from this strategy. 
10.  For example, in ﬁ  scal 2004 the Mint’s total “selling, general and administrative” costs equaled $88.9 
million. 64.8 percent of this was allocated to quarters, 28.8 percent to dimes, 0.9 percent to nickels, 
and only 1.1 percent to pennies, despite the fact that pennies represented 22.3 percent of cost of goods 
sold and 3.2 times as many pennies were produced as quarters. 
11.  Likewise, the Mint appears to have recently redeﬁ  ned its cost breakdown to make the penny look more 
proﬁ  table than it is. In ﬁ  scal 2001, when the penny was more proﬁ  table, the Mint counted “general 
and administrative” costs for pennies as $3.7 million. In ﬁ  scal 2004, it counted “selling, general and 
administrative” costs for pennies as only $1.0 million – as the quantity of pennies sold fell by 44 percent, 
its overhead costs were calculated to have fallen by 73 percent. In fact, overhead costs assigned to 
pennies fell by more than 50 percent from 2003 to 2004, although revenue from pennies increased.
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